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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§78A-3-102.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence5 fraud;
etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party of his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(b) How presented.
Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive
pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the
option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4)
insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party.
A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further
pleading is permitted.
(h) Waiver of defenses.
A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or by
answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which
1

relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the
objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later
pleading if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the
trial on the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the
parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the
court shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall
be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may
have been received.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I,

Nature of the Case.
This appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals concerns the standards for setting

aside a disputed default judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The underlying case involves claims by the Plaintiffs/Appellees William Judson and Donna
Judson ("Judsons"), against Defendant/Appellant Wheeler RV Las Vegas, LLC's ("Wheeler")
arising out of the sale of a motorhome. The Judsons prevailed in the trial court and Court of
Appeals. This Court granted Wheeler's petition for a writ of certiorari.
II.

Course of Proceedings.
The complaint was filed in the trial court on August 16, 2007, and was served upon

Wheeler on August 20, 2007. (R. 1-18.) During September, 2007, Judsons' counsel, Gary
Kuhlmann, was contacted by Sharon Nelson, attorney for Wheeler. Ms. Nelson requested an
extension of time to answer the complaint. She informed Mr. Kuhlmann that she believed her
client was not liable to the Judsons because Wheeler had purchased the involved dealership after
the sale of the motorhome at issue in this case to the Judsons. (R. 38, 47.) In mid-September,
2007, Mr. Kuhlmann agreed to grant Ms. Nelson an extension to allow her a short time to
provide Mr. Kuhlmann with evidence that her client was not the proper party in the case. (R. 38,
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47.) After not hearing from or receiving information from Ms. Nelson, Mr. Kuhlmann's office
contacted Ms. Nelson's office by phone on October 15, 2007, and demanded that the requested
information be provided or an answer be filed. (R. 38, 47.) On October 30, 2007, Mr. Kuhlmann
received a fax from Ms. Nelson containing a two page Bill of Sale which v/as apparently part of a
larger contract. (R. 38, 47, 51-53.) On that same date, Mr. Kuhlmann's office responded to Ms.
Nelson's fax and informed he that to evaluate the matter, and determine who was responsible for
the dealership liabilities, Mr. Kuhlmann would need to receive the Purchase Agreement and other
documents related to the alleged sale of the dealership. (R. 38, 47.) On November 1, 2007, Mr.
Kuhlmann received a second fax from Ms. Nelson requiring that Mr. Kuhlmann sign a
confidentiality agreement before any further documents would be provided. The demand was for
a general confidentiality agreement and was not limited to financial or proprietary matters. (R.
38, 47, 58.) Mr. Kuhlamann refused to sign the confidentiality agreement since it was Wheeler
that was requesting that it be dismissed from the case and because to do so could prejudice the
Judsons in using the information in the purchase documents in the case in the trial court. (R. 47,
60.)
After receiving no further information and having no further contact with Ms. Nelson, on
November 27, 2007, Mr. Kuhlmann, by letter, advised Ms. Nelson that the plaintiffs would be
seeking the entry of default and default judgment. (R. 47, 60.) On that same date the Judsons
filed their Application for Entry of Default and Motion for Entry of Default Judgment. (R. 1922.) A Default Certificate was entered on December 3, 2007, and Default Judgment was entered
on December 4, 2007. (R. 23-25.) Wheeler took no further action to prevent the entry of default.
On December 19, 2007, Mr. Kuhlmann received a phone call from William Frazier, the new
3

attorney fro Wheeler. Mr. Frazier asked if Mr. Kuhlmann would be willing to stipulate to set
aside the default judgment based upon his assertion that his client had purchased the business
after the Judsons' purchased the motorhome at issue. While Mr. Kuhlmann refused to simply
stipulate to set aside the default without some evidence of the factual assertions of Wheeler's
counsel, Mr. Kuhlmann relayed to Mr. Frazier a continuing willingness to review any documents
Mr. Frazier would like to provide. At the end of the conversation Mr. Frazier informed Mr.
Kuhlmann that he would be obtaining and would provide documentation to show that Wheeler
was not the proper defendant in the matter. (R. 48, 62.) To this date such documentation, or
other evidence has not been provided.
On February 29, 2008, four days shy of the three months from the date of the Default
Judgment, Wheeler filed its Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) and
(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 21, 22.) At no time did Wheeler seek to have the
case dismissed or to have the default judgment be declared void by the trial court, but rather
sought only to have the trial court set aside the default judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) and (6). (R.
30-33.) Following oral argument the trial court ordered both parties to prepare proposed findings
and orders. Wheeler's proposed findings or order fail to reference lack of personal jurisdiction as
a ground for setting aside the default judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4). (R. 90-92) (Add. 1.)
On June 24, 2008, the trial court denied Wheeler's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment
(Rule 60(b) Motion). (R. 68-74.) Wheeler filed a timely appeal. (R. 80.) On July 23, 2009, a
panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. See Judson v. Wheeler RVLas Vegas, LLC, 2009 UT
App 199, No. 20080688-CA, slip op. at 3 (July 23, 2009) (referred to hereafter as Court of
Appeals Opinion). Wheeler's petition for rehearing was denied on September 14, 2009. This
4

Court extended the time to file a petition for certiorari to November 13, 2009. On January 28,
2010, this Court granted certiorari.
III.

Statement of Facts.
The Judsons purchased a 2000 Journey RV in 2002 from Wheeler RV of Las Vegas for

$124,527.50. (R. 1-2.) At the time of purchase, Wheeler failed to disclose that the RV was a
manufacturer's buyback and failed to properly execute a limited warranty for repurchased
vehicles. (R. 2.) The Judsons later sold the RV in question, however, Judsons were ultimately
forced to buy it back when it was discovered that the RV was an undisclosed manufacturer's
buyback. (R. 3.) The Judsons then brought suit against Wheeler under breach of contract, fraud,
misrepresentation, and statutory theories. (R. 3-8.) The Complaint sought compensatory
damages of $147,274.08, plus punitive damages, attorney fees, and costs. (R. 8.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals complied with, and properly applied, Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, in finding that Wheeler failed to seek relief under Rule 60(b)(4) and therefore
waived such claim. Wheeler's claim that the default judgment should have been set aside under
Rule 60(b) was premised only by subsections (1) and (6) of the rule, and therefore failed to
request relief from the district court under Rule 60(b)(4).
Additionally, the Court of Appeals' determination that Wheeler failed to present a
meritorious defense was proper, and in conformity with this Court's holing in Lund v. Brown, 11
P.3d 277 (Utah 2000). Applying the standards set forth in Lund, the Court of Appeals found that
the three ambiguous summary statements (regarding personal jurisdiction) which Wheeler
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provided in its initial 60(b) motion, failed to raise to the level of a "clear and specific proffer of a
defense" as required by Lund.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Court of Appeals' Application of Rule 60(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure was Proper.

Wheeler argues that this Court should ignore the plain language and intent of Wheeler's
initial Rule 60(b) motion, which is clearly premised under subsections (1) and (6) of the rule, and
fails to invoke or seek relief under subsection (4) of the same. (See Wheeler's Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at p. 1 - 2); ( Wheeler argues that rather than construing Wheeler's Rule 60(b) motion
"according to the subsection that best fits the substantive argument,... the Court of Appeals
rejected that established approach and instead ruled that Petitioner's Rule 60(b) motion
challenging personal jurisdiction automatically failed for not specifically invoking subsection
(4)"). Wheeler cites State v. 736 North Colorado Street, 2005 UT 90, 127 P.3d 693, Chatterton
v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255 (Utah 1997), Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App
110, 2 P.3d 451 and Saysavanh v. Saysavanh, 2006 UT App 385, 145 P.3d 1166, as cases
requiring that a court consider the merits of jurisdictional challenges even if subsection (4) of
Rule 60(b) is not specifically cited in the motion. However, it is clear that the Court of Appeals
was cognizant of the requirements of and considered the 736 North Colorado Street, Franklin
Covey Client Sales, Inc. and Saysavanh cases since such cases are cited by the Court of Appeals
in the opinion below. A careful review of the Court of Appeals' Opinion shows that the Court of
Appeals complied with established jurisprudence by considering all of Wheeler's arguments even
though subsection (4) was not specifically cited.

6

Nowhere in the Court of Appeals opinion does it state that Wheeler waived its
jurisdictional challenge merely because it failed to specifically cite to subsection (4) when it
sought relief from the trial court. (See Court of Appeals Opinion.) Rather, the Court of Appeals
found that under the arguments and content of Wheeler's motion, and the record in the case,
Wheeler had failed to seek relief under Rule 60(b)(4) and therefore waived such claims. In
making this decision the Court of Appeals was cognizant of, and in fact quoted from, Wheeler's
argument before the trial court that Wheeler "will be able to demonstrate t h a t . . . any assertion of
personal jurisdiction over [Wheeler] is highly questionable." (Court of Appeals Opinion at 2 3.) The Court further noted that Wheeler had, in its motion to the trial court, "failed to identify
any particular problem with personal jurisdiction." (Court of Appeals Opinion at 3.) Thus, the
Court of Appeals, in accordance with established precedent, reviewed Wheeler's motion as a
whole and found that Wheeler had failed to properly and adequately request relief from the trial
court based upon any grounds which would fall under Rule 60(b)(4). Therefore, the Court of
Appeals properly found that Wheeler had waived such defenses. (Court of Appeals Opinion at 2,
fn. 2.)
The fact that the Court of Appeals reviewed the content of the arguments of Wheeler's
Rule 60(b) motion prior to determining that Wheeler failed to properly assert a claim under
subsection (4) is also supported by the Court of Appeals' treatment of Wheeler's Rule 60(b)(6)
claims. In footnote 1 to the Opinion, the Court noted that Wheeler's motion cited Rule 60(b)(6)
but that "Wheeler's motion did not specifically identify any such other grounds justifying relief
from judgment."

7

It is the content of Wheeler's Rule 60(b) motion and the other documents filed by
Wheeler that are most telling as to whether Wheeler was seeking relief under subsection (4).
Wheeler's claim was that "Wheeler will be able to demonstrate that. . . any assertion of
jurisdiction over [Wheeler] is highly questionable. (Court of Appeals Opinion at 2 - 3),
(Emphasis supplied). Furthermore, the "Conclusion" of Wheeler's motion and memorandum did
not request that the trial court dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction or find the judgment void
due to lack of jurisdiction. In fact, nowhere in Wheeler's motion does it assert that the judgment
rendered is void. Instead, Wheeler "requests that the Default Judgment entered against it on or
about December 5, 2007 be set aside, due to mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, (sic) and
surprise." (R. 32.)
After the hearing, the trial court requested that the parties submit proposed findings and
orders. Wheeler did so. (R. 90-92.) Nowhere in Wheeler's proposed findings or order is
jurisdiction referenced as a means for the trial court to find that the default judgment was void
due to lack of personal jurisdiction. (See Add. 1.) It clearly is evident from Wheeler's proposed
findings and order that Wheeler did not raise issues before the trial court based upon Rule
60(b)(4). In fact, the sole reference to personal jurisdiction found in Wheeler's proposed findings
or order is found in the following statement: "Further, Defendant has provided facts
demonstrating that legal and valid defenses exist; namely, lack of personal jurisdiction and
misjoinder of parties." (R. 91) (Add. 1.) Thus, the issue of whether the judgment was void under
URCP 60(b)(4), was never raised in the trial court, was never briefed by the parties and was
never decided by the trial court. Indeed, the trial court's findings, conclusions and order, do not
even refer to a jurisdictional claim since Wheeler did not raise the issue of personal jurisdiction
8

before the trial court as a basis for relief, but wished to set aside the default based upon mistake,
inadvertence or excusable neglect in order to raise issues regarding joinder of parties and
jurisdiction by way of a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss. (R. 68-74.)
Based upon the content of Wheeler's Rule 60(b) motion, and proposed findings and
order, Wheeler was not intending to contest jurisdiction with its motion. Rather, Wheeler
indicated it would be able to show, some time in the future, that jurisdictional issues existed. (R.
31-32.) Wheeler further did not assert a lack of jurisdiction but simply indicated that, based upon
what Wheeler may be able to show in the future, jurisdiction would be "highly questionable." (R.
31-32.) Further, and as noted by the Court of Appeals, Wheeler's motion "failed to identify any
particular problem with personal jurisdiction." (Court of Appeals Opinion at 3.)
Wheeler's contention that its request to set aside the default judgment under Rule 60(b)
for lack of personal jurisdiction was expressed plainly (further arguing that any drafting flaws
contained in such request should not wipe out Wheeler's jurisdictional challenge), fails to
adequately address the Court of Appeals finding that Wheeler "failed to identify any particular
problem with personal jurisdiction." (Court of Appeals Opinion at 3.) If this Court were to
accept Wheeler's argument, all that would be required of a party seeking relief from a judgment
or order under Rule 60(b) would be that they simply allude to the fact that, or mention
somewhere in their motion that, personal jurisdiction may be at issue. To avoid such precedent
this Court should find that the Court of Appeals did not err in its treatment of Wheeler's
contention that the district court erred in refusing to set aside the default judgment pursuant to
Rule 60(b)(4), because Wheeler's conclusory and unsupported statements regarding personal
jurisdiction did not constitute a request for relief under Rule 60(b)(4).
9

II.

The Court of Appeals Properly Applied Existing Standards in Determining
that Wheeler Failed to Adequately Establish a Meritorious Defense.

Wheeler claims that the Court of Appeals erred by failing to apply this Court's holding in
Lundv. Brown, 2000 UT 75, 11 P.3d 277, in determining whether Wheeler adequately alleged a
meritorious defense in its initial Rule 60(b) motion. "The purpose of the meritorious defense
rule is to 'prevent the necessity of judicial review of questions which, on the face of the
pleadings, are frivolous.'" Id. at %28 (citingErickson v. Schenkers Int'l Forwaders, Inc., 882
P.2d 1147, 1148 (Utah 1994) (quotingState exrel Dep'tofSoc. Servs. V. Musselman, 667 P.2d
1053, 1060 (Utah 1983)). "The rule requires the party seeking to set aside a judgment to 'show'
that he or she 'has a meritorious defense to the action.'" Id (citing Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1148)
(quoting Musselrnan, 667 P.2d at 1055-56) (footnote omitted).
In deciding whether a meritorious defense had been alleged by Wheeler, the Court of
Appeals cited Hernandez v. Baker, 2004 UT App 462, 104 P.3d 664, which adopted the
standards of Lund. In fact, the Court of Appeals opinion specifically sets forth the requirements
of Lund and analyzes Wheeler's motion under such requirements. (See Court of Appeals
Opinion.) In Lund, the Court's central inquiries were "whether Lund and B&B (1) adequately
'showed' the trial court a (2) proposed defense containing allegations, facts, or claims that, if
proven at trial, would preclude total or partial recovery by the Browns." Id. at 28. The Court in
Lund went on to explain what a party must do to "show" a meritorious defense. "[W]e have
made it clear that a party need not actually prove its proposed defenses to meet this standard." Id.
at 29. The Court then articulated the policy underlying the meritorious defense rule. "That
policy is simply to prevent the necessity of treating defenses that are frivolous on their face.
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Thus, where a party presents a clear and specific proffer of a defense that, if proven, would
preclude total or partial recovery by the claimant or counterclaimant, it has adequately shown a
nonfrivolous and meritorious defense..." Id at 29.
Wheeler seems to assert that by simply stating in its initial Rule 60(b) motion that "[t[he
evidence will show that Plaintiffs have sued the wrong party" and that "Plaintiffs have failed to
demonstrate a proper basis for personal jurisdiction" (R. 31, 32), they have met the standard this
Court set forth in Lund. In fact Wheeler states "Erickson and Lund require nothing more."
(Appellant's Brief at 18.) Wheeler also contends that the Court of Appeals "denied Wheeler
relief because it 'failed to identify' particular facts supporting its defenses." (Appellant's Brief at
18.) However, contrary to Wheeler's assertions, nowhere in the two paragraphs of the Court of
Appeals Opinion which address Wheeler's failure to present a meritorious defense does it refer to
Wheeler's failure to identify facts as fatal to Wheeler's motion. The Court of Appeals found that
Wheeler failed to provide a "clear and specific proffer of a defense" as required by Lund. (Court
of Appeals Opinion at 3.) In so deciding, the Court of Appeals referred to the three summary
statements that Wheeler provided in its motion, that the plaintiffs had sued the wrong party, that
Wheeler did not own the dealership when the plaintiffs purchased their RV and that Wheeler, in
the future, could demonstrate that personal jurisdiction was highly questionable. (Court of
Appeals Opinion at 3) The Court of Appeals determined that these ambiguous summary
statements did not raise to the level of a "clear and specific proffer of a defense" under the
circumstances. In doing so, the Court of Appeals did not deviate from Lund, but rather applied
Lund to this case.

11

Wheeler seems to assert that ambiguous summary allegations are sufficient to establish a
"clear and specific proffer of a defense." Under Wheeler's argument, a meritorious defense
would exist simply by stating: "jurisdiction is lacking." Such is not a clear and specific proffer
under the parameters of Lund as incorporated into the Court of Appeals' Opinion. Furthermore,
such an assertion would be in direct conflict with this Court's clearly articulated fundamental
policy underlying the meritorious defense rule. "That policy is simply to prevent the necessity of
treating defenses that are frivolous on their face." Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, f 29, 11 P.3d
277. Under the circumstances, Wheeler failed to make a clear and specific proffer of a
meritorious defense when it chose to rely only on the above referenced summary assertions of
potential defenses. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the district court's
denial of Wheeler's motion to set aside the default judgment based on the determination that
Wheeler failed to "present a clear and specific proffer" of a meritorious defense.
III.

Judsons Should be Awarded their Costs and Attorney Fees on Appeal

The judgment entered in favor of the Judsons awarded the Judsons their costs and
attorney fees incurred in obtaining judgment against Wheeler for breach of contract and other
relief. This award was based upon the contract under which the plaintiffs brought suit. Judsons
are entitled to an award of their costs and attorney fees incurred on appeal. See Valcarce v.
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998).
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals followed established jurisprudence in determining that Wheeler
waived any personal jurisdiction defense by failing to adequately raise the same as part of its
Rule 60(b) motion. The Court of Appeals further applied correct standards as established in
12

Lund in determining that Wheeler had failed to adequately present a clear and specific proffer of
a meritorious defense. Based upon the above, the plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court
affirm the Court of Appeals affirmation of the district court's denial, and award the Judsons their
costs and attorney fees incurred herein.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this^/dav of May, 2010.

Gary-QL Kuhknann
Attcfrney for Plaintiffs/Appellees
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Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on t h i s ^ day of May, 2010, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served on the following by the method indicated below:
Alexander Dushku
R. Shawn Gunnarson
Justin W. Starr
KIRTON & McCONKIE
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800
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(
(
(
(

Stephen R. Bangerter
R. Shawn Gunnarson
Justin W. Starr
KIRTON & McCONKIE
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William E. Frazier
Daniel P. Wilde
LAW OFFICES OF STEVEN R
BANGERTER
720 S. River Rd., Suite A-200
St. George, UT 84790

(j^) US Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Facsimile
( ) Electronically
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ADDENDUM 1

STEVEN R. BANGERTER (Utah Bar No. 10051)
WILLIAM E. FRAZIER (Utah Bar No. 11447)
LAW OFFICES OF STEVEN R BANGERTER
720 South River Road, Suite A-200
St. George, UT 84790
Telephone: (435) 628-7004
Facsimile: (435) 673-1964
Attorneys for Defendant,
WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM JUDSON and DONNA
JUDSON, husband and wife,

J [PROPOSED] ORDER

Plaintiffs,
) Civil No.: 070501867
VQ

'

WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC, a
Nevada foreign limited liability company,
dba WHEELER'S LAS VEGAS RV,
Defendant.

) Judge: Eric A. Ludlow
\
]

<j

Defendant, WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC's Motion to Set Aside Judgment, came
for hearing on May 15,2008 before the Honorable Eric A. Ludlow. After consideration of the
pleadings, court file, and oral arguments thereon, the Court rules as follows:
///
///
///

Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default is GRANTED.
Defendant demonstrated thiough the Affidavit of Sharon Nelson, that this Default was
taken as a result of surprise mistake, and inadvertence Based upon the giant of an open
extension given by Plaintiffs' counsel, and the ongoing communication between Defendant
Wheelers by and through their representative Sharon Nelson and Plaintiffs' counsel, there was no
rescission of the open extension to answer the complaint The first notice that Defendant had of
such rescission, by Plaintiffs' mailed Application foi Entry of Default, was not received until
December 5, 2007 due to an intervening weekend and out-of-state mailing Plaintiffs' counsel
could have faxed or telephoned Defendants to rescind his open extension to answer, but failed to
do so \ s such by the time that Defendants learned of the rescission of the open extension to
answer a Default Judgment had already been taken
Likewise, Defendant's Motion was made in accordance with Rule 60(B) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, in that xhe Motion was filed less than three months after the Default
Judgment was entered Further, Defendant has provided facts demonstrating that legal and valid
defenses exist, namely, lack of personal jurisdiction and misjoinder of parties
"The rule that courts will incline towards granting relief to a party who has not had the
opportunity to piesent his case is ordinarily applied at the xnal court level State of Utah v D
John Musselman and Linda Ann Coram (1983) 667 P 2d 1055 and Hnl 1983 Utah LEXIS 1086
'Where any reasonable excuse is offered by defaulting party, courts generally tend to favoi
granting relief jfrom a default judgment unless it appears that to do so would result m substantial

injustice to the adverse party " Westinghouse Elec Supply Co v Paul W Larsen Contractor
(1975), 544 P 2d 876
Here, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that substantial injustice would result m Setting
Aside the Default Judgment Plaintiffs have presented no evidence regarding substantial
prejudice would result m the event that this Motion were granted Plaintiffs may amend their
complaint to add parties should they so desire

Defendant must file an Answer or other responsive pleading on or before

DATED this

day of

, 2008

Honorable Eric A Ludlow

